Nuclear Deterrence in Iran–Zionist Entity Relations

Rasooli Saniabadi, Elham

doi:10.22034/irfa.2026.245173

Nuclear Deterrence in Iran–Zionist Entity Relations

Author

Elham Rasooli Saniabadi

Elham Rasooli Saniabadi, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Political Science and history, Yazd University, Yazd, Iran

10.22034/irfa.2026.245173

Abstract

The main aim of this research is to examine the stabilizing or destabilizing effects of nuclear weapons on international peace and security by focusing on the concept of nuclear deterrence and its underlying assumptions, and by typologizing the behavior of nuclear-armed states and analyzing their propensity for aggression or self-control. Accordingly, the main research question is: do nuclear weapons deter conflicts by making states feel more secure, or do they trigger more conflicts by enabling states to take greater risks in interstate disputes? In other words, what effect do nuclear weapons and their related capabilities have on the tendency of states possessing these weapons to seek war against their rivals? In response to this question, the hypothesis of this research is that nuclear weapons are not inherently instruments of aggression or conflict deterrents, but rather the meaning given to these weapons by leaders is what matters most. Therefore, in assessing the nature of the stabilizing or destabilizing effects of nuclear weapons, one must simultaneously pay attention to two semantic factors: the risk-taking or "zero-risk" tolerance of decision-makers in the face of a crisis, as well as the importance of the credibility and reputation of the nuclear-weapon state. Thus, the deterrent power of nuclear weapons, whether through nuclear balance or nuclear superiority, is influenced by these two semantic factors. This research is qualitative and explanatory, and in the data analysis section, the case study method will be employed, focusing on how Zionist entity, as a nuclear state, deals with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Keywords

Iran

Zionist entity

deterrence

nuclear weapons

security dilemma

Article Title Persian

سلاح‌های هسته‌ای و تأثیر آنها بر صلح و امنیت بین‌المللی؛ مطالعه موردی: نحوه مواجهه اسرائیل، به عنوان یک نهاد هسته‌ای، با ایران

Author Persian

الهام رسولی ثانی آبادی

الهام رسولی ثانی آبادی، دانشیار دانشکده حقوق، علوم سیاسی و تاریخ، دانشگاه یزد، یزد، ایران

Abstract Persian

هدف اصلی این پژوهش بررسی اثرات تثبیت‌کننده یا بی‌ثبات‌کننده سلاح‌های هسته‌ای بر صلح و امنیت بین‌المللی است، با تمرکز بر مفهوم بازدارندگی هسته‌ای و مفروضات زیربنایی آن، گونه‌شناسی رفتار دولت‌های هسته‌ای، و تحلیل گرایش آن‌ها به تجاوز یا خویشتن‌داری. بر این اساس، پرسش اصلی پژوهش این است که: آیا سلاح‌های هسته‌ای از طریق ایجاد احساس امنیت بیشتر در دولت‌ها، از بروز درگیری‌ها جلوگیری می‌کنند؟ یا اینکه با توانمند ساختن دولت‌ها برای پذیرش ریسک بیشتر در منازعات میان‌دولتی، درگیری‌های بیشتری را برمی‌انگیزند؟ به عبارت دیگر، سلاح‌های هسته‌ای و قابلیت‌های مرتبط با آن‌ها چه تأثیری بر تمایل دولت‌های دارای این سلاح‌ها برای اقدام به جنگ علیه رقبای خود دارند؟ در پاسخ به این پرسش، فرضیه پژوهش این است که سلاح‌های هسته‌ای ذاتاً ابزارهای تجاوز یا بازدارنده درگیری نیستند، بلکه آنچه اهمیت دارد، معنایی است که رهبران به این سلاح‌ها می‌بخشند. بنابراین، در ارزیابی ماهیت آثار تثبیت‌کننده یا بی‌ثبات‌کننده سلاح‌های هسته‌ای، باید همزمان به دو عامل معنایی توجه کرد: تمایل به ریسک‌پذیری یا تحمل ریسک «صفر» تصمیم‌گیرندگان در مواجهه با بحران، و همچنین اهمیت اعتبار و حیثیت دولت هسته‌ای. بدین ترتیب، قدرت بازدارندگی سلاح‌های هسته‌ای - چه از طریق توازن هسته‌ای و چه از طریق برتری هسته‌ای - از این دو عامل معنایی تأثیر می‌پذیرد. این پژوهش از نوع کیفی و تبیینی است و در بخش تجزیه و تحلیل داده‌ها، از روش مطالعه موردی با تمرکز بر نحوه مواجهه اسرائیل به‌عنوان یک نهاد هسته‌ای با جمهوری اسلامی ایران استفاده خواهد شد.

Keywords Persian

ایران

اسرائیل

بازدارندگی

سلاح‌های هسته‌ای

معضل امنیتی

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