This article examines how the United States' selective multilateralism contributed to the institutional paralysis of the United Nations in responding to the Zionist regime's 2023–2024 war on Gaza. Selective multilateralism refers to Washington's practice of engaging with, or bypassing, multilateral mechanisms depending on whether institutional outcomes advance its strategic interests. This behavior aligns with the assumptions of structural realism and the instrumentalist interpretation of international institutions (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001), whereas liberal institutionalism and constructivism emphasize sustained multilateral cooperation and adherence to international norms (Keohane, 1984; Finnemore, 1996).
The case study of the Gaza war demonstrates that the United States' unconditional support for the Israeli regime significantly constrained the functionality of the Security Council, repeatedly blocking ceasefire and condemnation resolutions through the use of the veto. As a result, the United Nations' response was largely limited to initiatives within the General Assembly and non-binding expressions of concern, which had minimal impact on curbing the violence.
Employing an analytical–theoretical approach, this article conceptualizes selective multilateralism and institutional paralysis, evaluates the role of the United States in undermining the effectiveness of the United Nations during the Gaza crisis, and assesses the broader implications of this behavior for the future of the global multilateral order.