Abstract
This article examines how the United States’ selective multilateralism contributed to the institutional paralysis of the United Nations in responding to the Zionist regime’s 2023–2024 war against Gaza. Selective multilateralism denotes Washington’s practice of engaging with or bypassing multilateral mechanisms based on whether institutional outcomes advance its strategic interests. This behavior is broadly consistent with structural realism and the instrumentalist view of international institutions (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001), whereas liberal institutionalism and constructivism stress the need for sustained multilateral cooperation and adherence to international norms (Keohane, 1984; Finnemore, 1996).

The case study of the Gaza war demonstrates that the United States’ unconditional support for the Israeli regime impeded the Security Council’s functionality, repeatedly blocking ceasefire and condemnation resolutions through the veto. Consequently, the UN’s response was largely confined to General Assembly initiatives and non-binding expressions of concern, with minimal effect on limiting the violence.
Using an analytical–theoretical approach, the article explores the concepts of selective multilateralism and institutional paralysis, evaluates the U.S. role in weakening UN effectiveness during the Gaza crisis, and assesses the broader implications for the global multilateral order.

Keywords: Selective multilateralism; institutional paralysis; United Nations; Security Council; U.S. foreign policy; Gaza war; structural realism.