

# China's Belt and Road Initiative Dominance or Development and American Response

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## Abstract

China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has attracted the eye of the many economists worldwide. Many of these economists believe that the Belt and Road Initiative is part of China's vision of a world where America will no longer be the dominant superpower. It is possible that this may be true. China has committed an outsized chunk of its resources towards this project. More than \$1 trillion worth of investments are poured into projects which are directly or indirectly associated with the Belt and Road Initiative. the question is of what else the U.S should do if it's serious about countering Chinese influence.? Will the developing world fall under China's sway? whether the U.S should worry about the economic and political influence these projects may bring for China? This paper to both identify areas of common interest and possible cooperation, also as shed light on areas of disagreement that need further work.

**Keywords:** *America, China, Belt and Road initiative, Negative, Positive*

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## **Introduction**

One Belt One Road initiative of China is that the most vital megaproject of international economics within the current situation. With this plan, China pursues major goals in terms of economic process, especially energy security, expanding its influence in various regions, access to global markets, also as creating more cost effective communication and transportation. The idea is to facilitate the availability of energy, goods, and convey the varied parts of the world closer to China.

Originally named the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative, BRI comprised of “the Silk Road Economic Belt” and “the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road” was suggested by Chinese President Xi Jinping in Astana, Kazakhstan, and Jakarta, Indonesia, in September and October 2013. BRI proposed five Corridor that integrate the Eurasian. They include policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to people communication (Rolland, 2017 :43). These links reflect Beijing’s vision that mixes both soft connections like policy cooperation and hard connections including transcontinental networks. These connections are divided mainly into six economic corridors: China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor, New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor, China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor, China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor(Hong Kong Trade Development Council , 2017). China has mobilized an enormous amount of political, financial, technical, and human resources at different administrative levels to urge BRI started.

This plan consists of two parts: One New Silk Road and therefore the second Sea Silk Route. China by introducing this plan is pursuing ambitious goals. These goals include economic process, ensuring energy security, expansion of the sphere of influence, access to world markets and building cost effective transportation and transit routes. This project seeks to facilitate the transfer of energy and commodities to China and from China to other parts of the planet within a brief span of time. The sea route consists of two directions: First a route from the coasts of China through the South China Sea and then the Indian Ocean to Europe and the second from the shores of China to the South Pacific Ocean.

several financing institutions have been erected to support the flagship initiative. Officially launched in June 2015, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) gathered 57 founding countries, among which 18 are European nations (Rolland, 2017: 195). Despite U.S. warnings, major European countries including Britain, France, Germany, and Italy became signatories at AIIB's opening ceremony (Matthias and Jasone, 2018). next another 13 countries and regions. 42 regional members, 22 non-regional members, and 20 perspective members located in all continents joined AIIB. (Rolland, 2017: 57). Besides AIIB, China also secured \$100 billion from the New Development Bank created by and for the BRICS countries. Apart from multilateral financing, China has also mobilized its domestic resources to support its flagship initiative. Drawing from its foreign reserve and its policy banks, China created the Silk Road Fund that will allegedly provide \$40 billion to profitable mid- and long-term projects (Rolland, 2018:51). China's policy banks the Export-Import Bank of China and China Development Bank will also invest in major projects abroad based on the necessity of development goals. (Sicilia and Scissors ,2018).

Security-wise, China has built up its naval base at Djibouti, and officially opened it in early, 2017. Located near the Gulf of Aden where the busiest maritime routes cross, the Djibouti base is

said to be able to provide logistic support for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) (Blanchard, 2017). Although this is the first Chinese naval base abroad, Navy has involved in escort missions in the Gulf of Aden for more than a decade. A strengthened PLA Navy presence in the Indian Ocean would protect Chinese investment and constructions along the 21st Maritime Silk Road.

### **I. Belt and Road: Initiative or a Strategy**

The Belt and Road Initiative is a completely Chinese initiative. But what exactly is the One Belt and a Road initiative? This initiative supports five principles at the outset: Mutual respect, Non-aggression, No interference, Equality and Mutual Interest, Peaceful Coexistence (Gion, 2018). The B&R initiative also comes in five areas: Political Coordination, Connect to infrastructure, Advanced Business, Currency support (currency exchange), People exchange, Cultural diplomacy.

China has a global economy recovery plan. The project begins with China itself. From 1912 to 2020, China followed the process of modernizing its society and implementing a middle class structure. But to win the world, it has to face big challenges. China has the power to implement this strategy, but it has no attack power. According to this view, the initiative of a Belt and a Road of China is quite a peaceful strategy to improve relations between the peoples of the world. The goal is to peacefully link Asia, Europe and Africa on the basis of economic initiative. global economy will gradually play into the Belt and Road Initiative, if successful, will include a population of nearly 4.6 billion, which is more than 60% of the world's population, and total GDP of \$ 20 trillion, that is, 1/3 of global GDP (Boric, 2018). For some commentators, the Belt and Road project is a response to Western globalization to build a better world. Competition between China and the US has intensified as China strengthens and perhaps weakens US global dominance. Despite the interdependence and hope for Achieve at a win-win situation

instead of a zero-sum game, Historical experience shows that competition between important countries can easily be influenced by irrational factors, with unexpected or even undesirable outcomes. China enters the 21st century as a nation claiming universal relevance for the proper culture and institutions with the culture and global institutions. The Belt and Road project verifies this.

## II. Chinese and American Perceptions

**Chinese Perception:** A Safer Neighborhood: Lessening threats in western China is a perennial challenge for Beijing. Basic problems include Tibetan and Uighur breakaway movements and their cross-border advocates, narcotics transit, influence of Islamic saboteurs into western China at Through Central Asia, and even concerns about External support “color revolutions” in border areas (State Council Information Office ,2015). Strengthen infrastructure development and Connecting the territorial economy, in the Chinese analysts' point of view, could support by eliminating the roots of poverty and insecurity, reinforcement (often authoritarian and China-friendly) regimes, and tying Xinjiang more closely into the regional economy. A connected profit, although not expressly argued in Chinese sources, is that a safer western border region implies fewer strategic distractions and additional resources obtainable for China to expand its influence across Asia (Joel, 2018).

**More Secure Energy Supply and Transport Routes:** Another great challenge has been manifold China’s energy supplies, which stay deeply affiliate to maritime transport routes via the Strait of Malacca and other chokepoints (US, 2015). Dubbed the “Malacca Dilemma” during the Hu Jintao era, there was concern that Chinese oil imports may be banned by the foreign navies during the crisis. BRI projects such as an oil pipeline linking Pakistan’s Gwadar Port with Xinjiang and a second Sino-Russian oil pipeline could help reduce, but not eliminate, China’s overreliance on vulnerable sea lanes. The BRI’s maritime component, known as

the Maritime Silk Road, could also help secure China's continuing maritime shipments through additional port development, including the opening of new People's Liberation Army (PLA) navy overseas logistics bases (Joel, 2018). Stronger Chinese Economic and Diplomatic Influence: Chinese Experts describe the display of BRI projects as the realization of a "march west" the premise being that the absence of the U.S. as a strategic heavyweight in Eurasia has created an opportunity for China to extend its diplomatic and economic influence in the region while avoiding a costly direct competition with *Washington* (Wang, 2012:1).

**American Perception:** U.S. Analysts generally hold a more pessimistic vision towards the economic profit BRI could bring to other countries. They worry about whether China's partners will benefit a lot from BRI projects, and whether China is able to carry out the Initiative in the long run. According to their evaluation, "BRI is best understood as construction projects worth many billions of dollars taken on by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Perez and scissors, 2018)."

They believe that most BRI projects are construction projects rather than investment, in which Chinese money is used to hire Chinese contractors. They worry that these projects may not create as many jobs for local people as promised by the Chinese government. In addition, most money came out from Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Other scholars, believe that BRI has the potential to change the Eurasian landmass, and that the U.S. should collaborate with China when possible (Hart and Gewirtz, 2018:51). The U.S. would marginalize itself economically if it chooses to totally disregard BRI. Otherwise, the U.S. may lose in the process of the change of the economic balance of power internationally, and undermine the leading position of the U.S. in the world economy. Toward whether BRI is able to achieve its stated goals, American attitudes are more varied, with some believing that it could be beneficial to the region while other saying that it stems from selfish ends.

Different analyses from the military, major think tanks, and the government hold a consensus view that, through BRI, China is able to stabilize its western provinces that are threatened by separatist powers, secure energy supply routes from Central Asian countries and Russia, establish a larger military presence abroad than before, cultivate a stronger than ever political influence to its partners, and pivot away from the pressure exerted by America's rebalance to Asia. In fact, America's concerns over China's strategic and security gains in the region reflect a fundamental assumption that these gains undermine American hegemony and its relative advantage over China (Ratner, 2018). American allies and partners would possibly choose to abandon the U.S. and bandwagon with China for fear that the U.S. may not honor its security commitment.

Besides a direct competition, Washington also showed its concern over the future of international institutions and norms. China's power in international institutions grows despite whether AIIB (Asian infrastructure investment bank) challenges or supplements the existing system (Ikenberry and Lim, 2017). AIIB could gain power either by threatening to set up an alternative to the current system or by tightly connecting AIIB with the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank (ADB). With the reduction potential in institutional power, the U.S. is worried that the appliance of rules and norms would also change in favor of China and against the interests of the U.S. Over a longer period of time, it could challenge U.S. hegemonic power within the arena of worldwide institutions and order.

### **III. Consequences BRI for U.S**

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) represents an elementary play by China to reshape the globe around it. It involves the expenditure of enormous amounts of cash quite US\$1 trillion in line with some sources in developing property and alternative essential infrastructure across Eurasia, the Indian ocean region, Africa and South Pacific, and so a lot of the globe. whether or not

the initiative mainly has economic motivations however it definitely has considerable strategic consequences.

The BRI is provocative in its envisioned scale and attain. But China's Targets and benefits in pursuing the BRI have come under severe critique from the U.S, other Western developed countries, and even developing nations along the BRI for faults in transparency, economic sustainability, and good quality. These concerns are combined by worries that the BRI has underlying strategic motivations with the potential to modify the geopolitical perspective and universal governance standards of the international society.

**Negatives:** For the U.S these outcomes can go far beyond concerns about the control of foundation plans or the economic and political impacts those projects may bring for Beijing (David, 2018). In opposition to China's BRI initiative, the United States begins with several disadvantages: Washington lacks Beijing's appetite to expend money, as well as its ruthlessness in transactions. Besides that, the United states-private sector does not have a persuade interest in deploying large sums of money in the developing world given investment opportunities elsewhere (Kapsten and Shapiro, 2018).

**Transparency and External Participation:** The lack of transparency around the project has been one of the largest sources of U.S. objections to the BRI's performance. ambiguity makes it difficult for External firms to become involved in BRI-related projects until they are already in motion, and it may also create a fertile environment for corruption. These concerns are not special to the BRI and are also reflected in the broader ongoing U.S.-China commerce and economic disputes over fairness and reciprocity for Unites states firms operating in China. Beijing continues to encourage External investment to help dominate the enormous deficit of capital needed to complete its vision, but there is a disconnect between those looking to participate and actual opportunities. Low standards, difficulties competing in the procurement and bidding process, and riskiness of investments are

further impediments to joining (Max, 2018).

**Geopolitics and Global Governance:** As long as opacity is the norm in BRI initiative, it will be tough for the U.S and other like-minded countries to view the initiative in a positive light. Not only does it encourage corruption and intensify the debt woes of developing nations, the lack of transparency also fuels suspicions that BRI works as a Trojan horse for Chinese supremacy. China religiously repeats that it “has no geopolitical calculations” for the BRI (Verma ,2018). However, the initiative’s scale means that it necessarily has geopolitical implications. When this is the Issue with a lack of transparency, Beijing's assertions of “win-win cooperation” and a “community of common destiny” seem disingenuous at best, and at worst a mask to conceal the real intentions of the initiative. In conditions of rising tensions between the U.S and China, it is not surprising that the more skeptical observers in Washington assume the Belt and Road projects to be a strategy aimed at replacing the United States as the world’s dominant power and cementing China’s rise.

The BRI has already begun to affect the region, not always the ones China intended. It catalyzes modernization drives from Pakistan to Myanmar, Investments that can actually help countries diversify their economies and achieve a decent level of investment. At the same time, it has awakened these countries at risk of over-indebtedness without delivering growth and so they are captured in China's political circuit. Importantly, this has given rise to a welcome “infrastructure arms race” in which Japan, India, Europe and even, belatedly, the United States are beginning to actively race with China to finance the productive grounds and help BRI members to eventually resist Chinese dominance (Schuster, 2018).

**Losing friends and influence:** There are many implications for the United States of a step-change in China’s role in the BRI. One of the main impetus for U.S. resistance to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan in the 1980s came from the scare that Russia would catch the ‘warm water’ port of Gwadar, allowing it to breach the

U.S. attempts to contain the Soviet Navy in icebound or geographically limited ports on Russian scope. A Chinese naval presence at Gwadar, or in Myanmar, Sri Lanka or Tanzania would be no less significant (David ,2018). The United States may not try to contain China completely like the Soviet Union, But the US Navy can nevertheless use the "Pacific Island Chains" as the carrier of indescribable aircraft to restrict the Chinese naval movement from its Pacific coast ports in the event of a conflict. With China's significant sea presence in the Indian Ocean, this strategy will be greatly weakened.

Most importantly, the land link between China and the Indian Ocean has the potential to fundamentally alter the economic and political orientation of many Indian Ocean nations. Again, the most prominent example is Pakistan, where Islamabad now looks to Beijing for economic and political support. But it also happens to a greater or lesser extent in many countries on the periphery of South Asia (Sri Lanka, Maldives, Myanmar) and the African coast (Sudan, Nigeria, Tanzania, Mozambique). America will find itself slowly but surely losing political and economic influence among those nations, and the security relations with it (David ,2018).

The United States strategic center of control at the IOR has always been the Persian Gulf, where the US Fifth Fleet rules the waves. This dominance may not be under threat at the moment, but China is already planning for the day when the Fifth Fleet moves on. This contains building warm relations with Persian Gulf countries such as Qatar (which currently hosts the forward headquarters of USCENTCOM) (Roy ,2018).

**Positives:** Many observers picture the BRI solely as a Chinese geopolitical ploy for global hegemony or the expression of a ferocious economy (Tamkin and Gramer, 2017). However, the reality is that the One Belt Road Initiative is not entirely in conflict with US interests and may even support them in specific cases. There are no inherent obstacles to investing in infrastructure or promoting global connectivity in the developing world. truly, the U.S has an interest in supporting both of these targets. If

Washington is to form a logical response to the BRI, it must affirm where the initiative may align with U.S. interests.

The United States must also understand that the BRI is moving fast, not just because it is a priority for the president, but because there is an actual demand for what China has to offer. According to the Asian Development Bank, Asia alone requires \$26 trillion in infrastructure investment by 2030 to sustain current growth rates (Asian Development Bank ,2017). According to the International Monetary Fund in other areas where the BRI is active, such as Latin America and Africa, Lack of sufficient infrastructure is one of the biggest obstacles to growth and development (Hamid and Berkmen, 2017:15). Given the scale of global infrastructure development needs, BRI is just a drop of water from a bucket of water, yet it also dwarfs what anyone else is doing to meet the challenge.

Beijing has concentrated on more of its consideration on emerging states and districts where Western investment is sizeable absent. Western expert's inclination to concentrate on valuable projects in large countries, but the BRI's largest achievement has possibly been smaller-scale but truly targeted investments in developing countries. Because these countries often lack the required subtraction, the marginal benefit of each yuan spent is greater than in more developed regions. One region of BRI's recognized benefit to the United States is in the security area. The United States has attention to infrastructure investment in an attempt to secure peace through development in Afghanistan.

**BRI's Legal Issues:** 1. Onerous' concession terms: While it is common for sponsors to provide legal terms, these railway concessions have a wide range of long taxation periods, long term rentals for Chinese companies and imports, plus Exemption from foreign workers' quota. Which in the long run is likely to raise issues regarding the competitiveness of existing domestic industries?

2. Contradictory priorities: The impact of the national government playing the dual role of actor and commercial

regulator becomes difficult if the regulator needs to take a back seat for the commercial actor or vice versa. This can lead to bias towards large infrastructure projects that must be economically and environmentally significant. Allow for "heavy" privileges The conditions disable the government's primary responsibility for managing the country's resources, including the protection of the environment and the rights of its citizens. It is therefore important, within the framework of concessional agreements, to determine how much the government waives its traditional responsibility for its population.

3. Financing: Properly funded arrangements are a critical element of any BRI project. Many of these projects are expected to be financed through the help of Chinese banks, financial institutions such as Asian Infrastructure Development Bank, Silk Road Fund and the new Development Bank. China is going through a steep curve in financing BRI projects, for example in export credit insurance, international cross-border transactions, project financing models and security law (Chance, 2017). It is no surprise that the deployment of funds raises issues because there is a lot to be gathered, especially a surveillance system capable of working across borders, providing transparency and a balanced approach to bridging the gap between public and private loans (McKinsey and Company, 2016). Some of the complications are related to the credit ratings of the BRI countries. Some countries in the project have no rating at all They have no credit. Investors, especially China's policy-makers, may not pay off their debt on regulated assets, so they can add to domestic debt items that are not already in their balance sheets (Deloitte, 2018).

4. Debt hangover: In addition to raising problems, the BRI also raises debt risks, such as debt repayments in some lending countries. Eight BRI member countries are now identified as potential BRI borrowers in debt risk based on the BRI project's loan pipeline (Hurley and Morris, 2018).

Looking at the BRI budget arrangements, recipient countries seem to have to bear the most financial risk, while China benefits

from both for those seeking BRI projects, while the economic outlook Tempting, the terms of the loan must be carefully considered (Aljazeera, 2017).

#### **IV. US Interests or International Order**

While some observers acknowledge China's Tangible progress in using its soft power and organizing itself as a world leader with the BRI Initiative, there are also many Warning reactions to China's new diplomacy. One concern often raised in the American press is that China attempts to establish new international organizations or economic frameworks that work as parallel alternatives to or totally replace US-led regimes such as the Bretton Woods organization (the WTO and IMF) or the dollar-based financial system. To some experts, BRI and AIIB point to an "important point" that challenges the foundations of the American economic order and introduces beginning of a "Sino-Centric"(Worthington and Manning, 2018). A saying often used in such discussions, "all roads will lead to Beijing," It is reminiscent of the old saying about the ancient Roman Empire that "all roads lead to Rome"(fallon, 2015:140). What, exactly, it means can vary a big deal, from China, making regional economic affiliation favorable to it, China is trying to turn Europe into a "mere peninsula at the end of the Asian continent"(Rolland ,2018). Despite Chinese promises to upgrade the inclusive framework, BRI appears "Quite unique" of the USA and its interests (Fallon, 2015:146).

More worrying is that China's monetary and political investment in BRI projects will commit it to more security activities outside China. Many analysts note that the PLA or other forces are likely to be called upon to protect Chinese nationals who may be threatened or harmed by terrorists while working on BRI projects (Djankov, et al, 2019).

Establishing a BRI security coordination mechanism as "inevitable" with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization now provides the possible basis for such a body (Lin ,2019). Some

believe that the division of Russian / Chinese labor in Central Asia, where Russia will continue to play a dominant security role despite China's economic dominance (Swaine, 2014: 43).

US observers have focused on specific discussions in China about the strategic consequences of the BRI, to some in the United States, this discussion illustrates the essence of BRI: A competitive gamble aimed at separating the EU and Japan from the US. For others, this simply draws attention to the fact that BRI may be a useful tool for various programs within China, some of which may influence its future (Mustafa, 2015:3).

### 5.1 How has the United States responded to China-led regional integration

The development of South and Central Asian economies is a long-standing goal of the United States that intensified after the US-led war in Afghanistan with President Barack Obama's axis in Asia. The Obama administration has often emphasized the need for the Afghan economy to help foreign pasts, and in 2014 the United States pledged to restore Central and South Asia to its "historic role as a key hub of world trade, ideas, and culture. "In doing so, the Obama administration supported the \$ 10 billion gas pipeline through Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. It has also spent billions of dollars on projects and roads and energy projects in Afghanistan and has used its diplomatic muscle to help create new frameworks for regional cooperation to strengthen Central Asian economic relations (Chatzky and Bride ,2018).

The Trump administration, unlike Obama, is pursuing a more confrontational strategy in the region against China. Some commentators have called on the United States to deepen its relations with its Asian partners. the Obama administration sought to work more broadly with the Trans-Pacific, an agreement rejected by Trump in favor of boosting bilateral ties. The Trump administration, backed by two parties in Congress, has instead tried to counter the BRI through BUILD law. The Overseas Private Investment Company (OPIC), a US government agency

for development finance, merged the components of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) into a separate agency with \$ 60 billion of investment funding. Although this is insignificant compared to the more than \$ 1 trillion that financial analysts expect China to spend on BRIs, Supporters believe it seeks to crowd in a larger pool of private investment by underwriting risk. the U.S could use BRI projects as a way to have China pay for infrastructure initiatives in Central Asia that are also in the U.S. interest (Chatzky and Bride, 2018).

The United States is the leader in this partnership. That is why it has pledged \$ 200 billion for Indian-Pacific projects. Other partners, such as Japan, have volunteered \$ 50 billion to help. While these amounts are substantial, they are very small compared to the one trillion dollars China is willing to spend. However, it seems that the US strategic goal is not to beat China but to control it (Prachi ,2019).

**Quadrilateral: US Strategy to Contain China:**One of the most heavily scrutinized aspects of the Donald Trump administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy is the role played by the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or “Quad,” comprised of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. Since the Quad's resurrection from a decade-long hiatus in November 2017 (Mehra, 2020), the group has met five times and has emphasized maintaining the liberal rules-based international order, which China seeks to undermine or overturn. the Quad signals unified resolve among these four nations to counter China's growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific. Under Trump, the United States has named the Quad as a mechanism to protect the "free and open" Indo- Pacific regain against increasing Chinese power. The United States has the most Politics anti-Chinese as bilateral relations rapidly spiral over a range of challenges, including coronavirus fallout, Taiwan, the South China Sea, trade, human rights in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, intellectual property theft, press freedoms, and others. Indeed, Washington is the only country to directly label China an “adversary” in its National Security

Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (Grossman, 2020).

**Taiwan Leverage:** the Taiwan Lever, it can be seen as an implication to the US-China relations against BRI. US makes it clear that he is expanding the US interest to Asia, deploying the Pivot to Asia strategy as the key policy to be implemented. In addition, the strategy also includes Taiwan as one of its key elements due to Taiwan position as strategic leverage for the US against China. The strategy was not met with direct military confrontation by China, but with increased Chinese capabilities and power projection in Asia. This leads to an ongoing security dilemma between the two most influential states in the world with each state pursuing its own interest (Poulsen, 2017:372). Thus, both states use its national power and capabilities to pursue its national interest, one state pursues its aspiration as a hegemon while the other pursues its survivability as a state. The clash between Offensive and Defensive Realism represented by the interest of the US and China is the implication that is caused by the US-Taiwan relations. Taiwan becomes a part of the cycle as both countries pursue of interest covers Taiwan. Nevertheless, the intricate relations between the US and Taiwan causes implications to the US and China relations that perpetuate the ongoing dilemma between the two countries. Both China and the US project their respective power to the point that they are locked in a vicious cycle of security dilemma and arms race with each other as result of Taiwan position within the US and China bilateral relation (Ai and Chang, 2016:81).

## V. China's Responses

**Doubts and Criticisms:** The repeated doubts and criticisms that the BRI has faced include: The BRI is China's foreign geopolitical strategy while China is undermining the existing international order; The BRI is China's attempt to create an area of influence - the participating countries are trapped by Chinese investment and compelled to supply Beijing with goods and raw materials before

the dumping of Chinese products, China will transfer its industrial overvalue to External countries; China is exporting its economic development model through the BRI, which will lead to overdevelopment, environmental pollution, debt traps, and more.

The most famous of those is probably about the BRI as China's new geopolitical strategy. This comment mainly says that China has grabbed the opportunity when Russia, the United States, and Europe left a geopolitical Empty in Central Asia. advocates of the idea believe that not only is the BRI a way to ensure energy supply security but it also helps China improve cooperation with its western neighbors and disrupt the balance of power in Central Asia to the detriment of the United States.

Indeed, this is a rang impression, according to this Assumption that Beijing and Washington are closed in a zero-sum game, has intrinsic contradictions. First, Russia, the U.S, and E.U have major interests in Central Asia and are until now pursuing their own strategies, so there is no vacuum. Secondly, however, the U.S. strategy of rebalancing has brought new difficulties to China, Beijing cannot give up its strategic interests in East Asia (Kendall & Shullman, 2018).

**Interpretation and Response:** The Chinese government Opinion that these skepticism and critique are usually reason by miscalculation and falsification (Yu, 2018). Some countries and commentators misunderstand the BRI because of inadequate enlightenment. Some negative aberrations come from prejudice against China and serve to help restrain China, and when compound with misanalysis of China's Targets, they connect the BRI with eloquence about China as scaring, thereby publishing a negative picture of the BRI .in addition, the gap between what is being proposed and how it is implemented will lead to a lack of understanding. Of course, some BRI projects have shortcomings, and many of its programs and work mechanisms need further strengthening. The China-Europe Railway Express, for example, has improved links between Chinese states and EU countries, but the service is costly and needs to be better managed.

**The Role of Multiple Actors:** Different players must perform their duties when executing BRI projects. This means that the basic relationship between government and business, politics and economics must be rational. In particular, the government is the policymaker, but the main jobs and communities are BRI practitioners and makers. The BRI pattern has been shaped by government and organization over the past five years. It would be misleading to confuse Chinese companies with Chinese government policy tools when thinking and analyzing BRIs.

It is difficult to conclude from this fact, while it should not be overlooked that there are differences between the interests of the Chinese government and Chinese businesses in the process. Indeed, jobs are the key to driving BRI progress. Their targets and actions are sometimes consistent with government policies, and sometimes they are too contradictory. Therefore, on the one hand, the Chinese government is actively working with other governments in coordination with new BRI policies and arrangements to improve the business environment, as well as support Chinese companies. This is an important guarantee that BRI can make progress. On the other hand, the Chinese government also monitors and regulates the conduct of companies through international norms and laws, and prevents companies seeking excessive profits that could harm the BRI. It also prevents market capture by enterprises and capital (Rowley, 2018).

**Rebalancing the Structure:** Standardization has been an important part of Beijing's efforts to develop the BRI over the past two years. Initially, China and the countries involved were at the forefront of the international market, so Chinese businesses and social organizations were encouraged to enter other countries' markets. In fact, BRI is a strategic plan based on Chinese policy to open its domestic market. One of the main goals of the BRI is to strengthen economic and social relations between China's seaside and inland areas and to solve a long-term development barrier that China is currently facing: the dual nature of the East

and West regions and urban and rural is a big challenge for this country (Kelly, 2019). With foreign challenges rising and the dividend decline following its entry into the World Trade Organization, rebuilding relations between these regions has become an urgent task for China. The global financial crisis of 2008 has accelerated China's need to address the problem, while accelerating China's response.

## **VI. Consequences for Iran**

the active Iran participation and engagement in the BRI can only further enhance its regional role. On the other hand, the BRI may help to solve some problems and eliminate some divisions in the Middle East. The current level of Iran's relations with the People's Republic of China could be described as positive and constructive. Such a pragmatic alliance is a result of the political pressure from the West, as well as economic necessity. Both the Chinese and Iranians perceive the American presence in Asia as a threat to their national security. For this reason, the China and Iran undertake activities that aim at limiting the U.S.'s sphere of influence in the Middle East, Central Asia, East Asia, and Southeast Asia. Moreover, this is the main reason why their policies are also attractive to the Russian Federation. This powerful political trio has an almost unlimited political potential to block any American or any other Western initiative in Asia.

With the advent of Joe Biden and the possible lifting of sanctions against Iran, a major obstacle to the expansion and deepening of Sino-Iranian relations will be removed, while providing a new impetus for Beijing's goal of integrating the Middle East into its ambitious OBOR plan.

Iran can serve as an important hub in this evolving transportation network" (Calabrese, 2018:174–175). Undoubtedly, the Belt and Road Initiative creates new opportunities for the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Both partners have complementary political as well as economic interests in this case. Iran has been trying to limit the U.S.'s

presence in the Middle east and Central Asia region, which is in line with Beijing's expectations and foreign policy objectives. It is clear that the BRI's role is not only to promote cooperation, peace, and trade in Eurasia, but also to limit the American sphere of influence as well as the U.S.'s naval superiority.

that the BRI may seriously affect Iran-China relations. Iran should maintain a constructive approach towards the BRI, both in case of the construction and its future operation. China can only benefit from this cooperation, especially in regard to the import of fossil fuels and export of industrial products to Iran. Furthermore, Iran's geopolitical position enables China to exploit existing trade routes connecting Central Asian states with the Persian Gulf region and to create new transport corridors, with particular reference to the so-called Southern Corridor of the BRI, which is to cross Central Asia, Iran, Turkey, and the Balkans (Gao, 2018).

All in all, the ultimate success of the Belt and Road Initiative depends to a large extent on Iranian participation and support, especially as far as geopolitical and logistical issues are concerned. For this reason, the Chinese will do a lot in order to please their Iranian counterparts and Iranians will do a lot to attract Chinese investors and benefit from the project.

## **Conclusion**

From the US perspective, policymakers need to weigh several competing factors to design a coherent response. On the one hand, too much confrontation with Beijing will have a stimulating role in US-Chinese relations and it will potentially increase the cost for US companies to participate in BRI projects. On the other hand, US partners such as Japan and India have voiced serious concerns about China's activities and are expanding China's strategic goals beyond its current level. BRIs, including the potential to work with its Indo-Pacific allies and partners. US officials should also anticipate that the expansion of BRI projects is likely to boost Chinese military diplomacy across Eurasia. Over the past 15 years, China has expanded empowerment, combination training

and high-level engagement with countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan. These efforts may continue as part of broader efforts to strengthen bilateral relations and help strengthen closer relationships with BRI partners (Blackwell and Harris, 2016). As China's military diplomacy expands, partners can have an incentive to play Beijing and Washington against each other to secure better deals.

In many cases, the BRI has produced positive results for developing countries, however, from a US view, BRI projects are frequently unsuccessful in their commitment to transparency, justice, sustainability, and good governance. Without this profile, in an environment of increasing tension between Beijing and Washington, policymakers in Washington are likely to view the BRI with suspicion and even hostility. In fact, such views have been already prevalent in the United States. until now, government officials have shown order when explaining the Trump administration's "free and open Indo-Pacific strategy," exhibition it primarily as a project for U.S. Regional Interactions. To double down on this approach, the United States and its democratic allies should concentrate on the tendency for transparency and good ruling among developing states, America' Indo-Pacific diplomacy can and should support its values overseas. China's relative power in the Pacific is on the rise and is apparently weakening US hegemony in the region. Precisely because there is so much interest in sharing with China, the United States should not avoid engagement and should not use BRI as a tool to do so. And the key point is that the increase in the number of projects on the Belt and Road project is evidence of America's dwindling power.

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