The Role of Academic Discourse in Shaping US-Israel Relations

Mohammad Ali Mousavi
Elham Kadkhodaee

Abstract

Highlighting the need for a more nuanced and multidimensional approach to understanding the relationship between America and Israel, the current article suggests constructivist international relations as a theoretical framework that has the capacity to explain such complexity through the concept of collective identity. According to Alexander Wendt's version of constructivism, in a Kantian culture of anarchy, states can become friends rather than rivals or enemies, meaning that the security and interests of the Self and Other become identical. In such a situation, a collective identity is formed between the two entities, leading to a friendship that involves not only governments but also the societies, and includes cultural and psychological dimensions as well as geopolitical ones. The current article argues that non-governmental entities such as the academia can play a significant role in constructing such a collective identity. Pro-Israel scholars actively promote a collective identity by producing output that clearly define Israel and America as the Self, and Arabs/Muslims/Palestinians as the Other or the dangerous common enemy. To remain more focused, Holocaust and anti-Semitism are selected as specific fields of study through which formation of the Self/Other dichotomy in academic discourse is studied. A critical discourse analysis of texts authored by Alvin H. Rosenfeld, Andrea Markovits and Josef Joffe will be carried out to demonstrate the themes through which this binary is established. The identification of these themes, and the overall endeavor of pro-Israel scholars to construct American identity in a pro-Israel manner, is necessary for understanding the ideational basis of American relations with Israel.

Keywords: International relations, constructivism, common/collective identity, America, Israel, academic discourse.
Introduction

The US-Israel relationship, often referred to as the “special relationship”, has always been of great interest to researchers and journalists, since it has been considered to influence significantly if not determine American foreign policy in the Middle East. In spite of this interest, the relationship is mostly studied through reductionist approaches and simplified as a static phenomenon. It is sometimes portrayed as too strong to fail, whilst, ironically, with the emergence of the slightest disagreement between politicians on the two sides, the death of the special relationship is heralded. But the reality is that a nuanced and accurate understanding of American foreign policy towards Israel is impossible without deeper analysis of all the different pillars that it is built upon, and the many different players that are active in shaping it. Explanations should go beyond consideration of the powerful pro-Israel lobby and the money that is spent on American politicians and media, although these are important aspects. In this line, the current study argues that constructivism provides a useful theoretical framework for understanding the relationship, in that it allows for the consideration of ideational and cultural factors as well as strategic and material ones.

The current article aims to delve deeper into the formation of friendship through common identity in the American-Israeli case. It puts forward the idea that the academia is an important non-governmental specter that can work towards forming a collective identity through the production of a specific pro-Israel academic discourse. This academic discourse both shapes the worldview of
America's future decision makers, and also trickles down to other types of discourse (including media and public discourse). Convincing American elite and masses that their country and Israel are both in the Self category ensures a supportive atmosphere for the implementation of pro-Israel foreign policy and unlimited support for the regime\(^1\). Since pro-Israel scholars are active in many different academic fields and disciplines, to remain focused, this study will concentrate on the specific concepts of Holocaust and anti-Semitism which are prominent ones amongst pro-Israel scholars.

In *Social Theory of International Politics*, Alexander Wendt (1999) introduces the idea of a constructivist approach to IR as a theory of the states system; one in which idealism, as opposed to materialism, and holism or structuralism, as opposed to individualism, are the main two pillars. A self-confessed positivist (ibid, 39), he adheres to a thin version of constructivism. Defining culture as shared knowledge, Wendt talks of three cultures of anarchy: the Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures, based on the role relationships of enmity, rivalry and friendship, respectively. Each culture in turn can be internalized to three degrees. The first degree of internalization is based on force and coercion; when states are forced to accept the roles of enemy, rival or friend. In the second degree they accept the role because they calculate it to be in their self-interest, and in the third degree, which is the strongest and deepest, they consider the role as legitimate.

Friendship is the basis of “the Kantian culture”, which is defined as “a new international political culture” that “has emerged in the West within which non-violence and team play are the norm” (Wendt 1999, 299). If the Kantian culture is internalized to the second degree, friendship has an instrumental and strategic nature. But if internalization of the third degree is achieved: “The cognitive boundaries of the Self are extended to include the Other; Self and Other form a single “cognitive region”” (Ibid, 305). Wendt calls this “collective identity”, a situation which brings about “collective interests”, where states see “each other's security not just as
instrumentally related to their own, but as literally being their own” (Ibid). He further asserts that though he has chosen the concept of “collective identity” to describe the third degree internalization of the Kantian culture, other concepts including “we-feeling” pointed to by Deutsch and “common in-group identity” emphasized by Gaertner et.al serve equally well. Wendt actually uses Deutsch’s concept of “security communities” which was first introduced in 1957, to describe the logic of the Kantian culture. A pluralistic security community is a system of states in which disputes and conflicts are managed peacefully and without reverting to violence (Ibid, p. 299).

Although friendship and alliance might appear to be the same in the realm of IR, Wendt explains that they are two distinct concepts. Allies are former rivals or even enemies who agree to cooperate for a limited time, and expect to return to the previous situation of rivalry or enmity in which the use of force is an option. But friendship, which is based on the two rules of non-violence (violence or the threat of violence will not be used in addressing conflicts) and mutual aid (if one member’s security is threatened, other members will stand by it), is expected to be permanent.

The present study proposes that arriving at a collective identity (or third degree friendship) between Israel and America is the ultimate goal of Israel advocates, which produces a relationship that goes well beyond a strategic alliance, in which the security and national interests of Israel are seen as equally important, or even the same as the security and national interests of the United States. In such a context, the question of whether American support for Israel undermines the national interest or not will be irrelevant, since the two are friends, and if this friendship has sunk to the third degree, it will not be driven by calculations of self-benefit, but by content. In other words, if the relationship with Israel is framed as a friendship based in the Kantian culture, and is fully internalized; unconditional support for Israel will be seen as legitimate and so no coercion, force or specific material interest is needed to enforce such a policy onto
American decision makers: “In the Third Degree case actors identify with others’ expectations, relating to them as a part of themselves. The Other is now inside the cognitive boundary of the Self, constituting who it sees itself as in relation to the Other, its ‘Me’” (Wendt 1999, 273).

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is the methodology used in the current study for analyzing the formation of common identity through academic discourse. Among the many approaches to CDA, van Dijk’s version has been selected. The main characteristic of critical science is that it goes beyond focusing on academic or theoretical problems, instead addressing social problems and the entities that have power and responsibility for solving such problems (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). What distinguishes critical discourse analysis (CDA) from other types of text analysis, such as content analysis, is its assertion that to understand and analyze meaning, the number of occurrence of certain words in a text cannot be relied on (Epstein, 2005).

CDA has been described as an approach (rather than a single method) that views language as “social practice” (Janks, 1997; Wodak & Meyer, 2009), and deals with the relationship between discourse and power. It is concerned with how social relations are legitimized or questioned/negated, and whose interests are served or negated (Janks, 1997; Leeuwen, 2015).

Teun Van Dijk’s concept of ideological square will be applied in carrying out critical discourse analysis of the selected texts. The concept is very useful in analyzing group relations since it is mostly focused on how the ingroup and outgroup are represented through discourse. Following a strategy of polarization where positive ingroup descriptions and negative outgroup descriptions are focused upon, an ideological square means that the Self’s positive and the Other’s negative properties and actions are emphasized, whilst the Self’s negative and the Other’s positive properties and actions are mitigated (van Dijk 1998). Through this type of representation, inequality is
justified, and polarized models\(^{(2)}\) are constructed (van Dijk 1993). In the next stage, such models are introduced as typical, not exceptional, and inexcusable (van Dijk 1993). In the specific case of common identity construction studied here, it has to be noted that the ideological square is applied not only to highlight the Self’s positive attributes, but through demonstrating that the two different groups of America and Israel actually share the same characteristics, the boundaries are shifted to provide a new definition of Self.

In the following analysis, first a number of experts and scholars who are considered influential in the academic sphere are selected. To qualify for this category, the scholars should either have had teaching experience in American universities, or have authored books that are discussed in American universities (this means that these books are used in university syllabi, or the authors are invited to give speeches on their work in universities). The scholars are picked to represent the different viewpoints among pro-Israel academics in each subject/theme, and they should also be prominent experts on the subject that is being studied. After a general introduction on each individual and their academic background, which provides us with the context of the discourse, a text from each one is chosen for more detailed CDA. In the first stage of research, the selected texts are read with the aim of identifying major themes that contribute to the construction of a common identity. After these themes are identified, and it is clear which themes are the ones that are repeated throughout the texts, a more detailed analysis of how they operate through the ideological square is carried out. In each text, passages that are related to the research questions and which emphasize the characteristics of the Self and Other, are selected and focused upon. A CDA of all the pages of the selected texts is impossible and unnecessary. Clarifying his methodology in the analysis of parliamentary debates on race and ethnicity, van Dijk explains that a detailed analysis of the entire available texts is “impossible”, so “passages that more or less explicitly deal with attributed properties of immigrants or resident
minorities, as well as those about discrimination, racism, and general policies and principles of political action regarding immigration and minority affairs” are selected (1993a, p. 64). He further explains that it is impossible to prove that this selection is representative, but this is not a problem since in his qualitative approach, no “quantitative proof” is needed: “We are interested in what Members of Parliament (Congress) say, and how they do so, but not how often” (Ibid). This is exactly applicable to the current study, since the aim is to identify the themes, arguments, and discursive strategies that are applied in the pro-Israel academic text, and how they work to naturalize friendship with Israel, not how often these statements are made.

I- Academic Discourse in US-Israel Relations

The tragic events of the Second World War, the anti-Semitism that facilitated and led to those events, and the way these issues have been narrated in popular and elite culture in different countries have a huge influence on today’s world, and in some cases contribute to how certain identities are constructed. Words such as Holocaust, anti-Semitism, Nazi, Hitler, concentration camp, etc. have turned into code words and schemas that instantly revive certain emotions and beliefs in the minds of those who hear them. This is why they are repeatedly referred to and used in discourse in order to make it effective, and to convey a sense of fear and threat. The Holocaust and its memory are kept alive using all forms of cultural representation, be it novels, scholarly studies, films, museums, etc., so that these code words live on as strongly as ever, and remain effective tools in certain types of discourse. The same is true for anti-Semitism, which has turned into a taboo in Western societies that can be used to silence certain discourses. Holocaust and anti-Semitism (AS) are important and loaded concepts that have been turned into complex study topics with their own academic experts, institutions and literature (with an accompanying public and media discourse, of course). Authors have even suggested the concept of new anti-Semitism in order to draw
attention to a threat that they claim not only is going away, but is becoming stronger and more dangerous (3). In other words, the literature on the Holocaust and anti-Semitism demonstrates that in many cases, the two concepts are “instrumentalised” to “reframe norms” or “delegitimate criticism” (MacDonald 2008, 1101).

Whilst some have interpreted the Holocaust and anti-Semitism as instruments in the hands of American conservatives to “delegitimate European criticism of the war on terror” (MacDonald 2008, 1101), the pro-Israel bias of such American conservatives cannot be doubted, and they can be simultaneously labeled Israel advocates. It is the works of such scholars that the current study aims to analyze.

Uncouth Nation: Why Europe Dislikes America by Andrea Markovits (2007b), Alvin H. Rosenfeld’s Anti-Americanism and Anti-Semitism: A New Frontier of Bigotry (2009), and Josef Joffe’s Nations We Love to Hate: Israel, America and the New Antisemitism (2005) are the three works that will be analyzed as examples of pro-Israel texts that construct a common identity through their discussion of Holocaust and anti-Semitism. These texts are perfect examples of how a group of AS scholars strives to demonstrate that America and Israel are hated by the same people and for the same reasons. Their discourse is important since it categorizes America and Israel in the common victim category, simultaneously proving the enmity of the Other which is portrayed as illogical and based on emotions such as envy and resentment. Different sections of the European society and political spectrum, together with Muslims, constitute the Other in this discourse. The works discussed in this section mostly focus on the European Other, whilst insisting that Muslim immigrants have been influential in the rising tide of AS in that continent. It should be noted that of the three authors discussed in this section, Josef Joffe and Andrei Markovits have been born and educated in Europe, and are affluent in European languages. This European background, which they emphasize in their writings, provides them with automatic authority to narrate the unfriendly atmosphere in Europe for their
American audience.

Josef Joffe, a PhD graduate of Harvard University, is publisher-editor of the German weekly Die Zeit, Professor of Political Science at Stanford, Abramowitz Fellow at the Hoover Institution, co-founder of The American Interest, and board member of Ben-Gurion University (4). Most of Joffe’s work is concentrated on America and its relationship with power, specifically its superpower status in the international order and whether the country is heading for decline or not. In all of these analyses Joffe makes sure to refer to anti-Americanism, especially its European strand, and to assert that this AA is always accompanied and is very similar to AS. In an interview with The Daily Beast on his book The Myth of America’s Decline (2014), he states that “I think one reason we hate Israel is because Israel is a modern state. And hatred always comes in two parts. It’s always against America and Israel. Always” (Joffe 2013). What makes Joffe’s Nations We Love to Hate: Israel, America, and the New Antisemitism (2005), the work that will be analyzed here, significant is that most other works on the link between AA and AS, such as those of Rosenfeld and Markovits, refer to it. The 16 page report is published by the Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of anti-Semitism.

Alvin Rosenfeld is Director of the Institute for the Study of Contemporary anti-Semitism, Irving M. Glazer Chair in Jewish Studies, Professor of Jewish Studies and English, Indiana University. His research interests include Holocaust Literature, American Jewish Literature and Contemporary anti-Semitism. Rosenfeld can definitely be named one of the main scholars of new AS since many of his works are focused on this topic, in which he sets to define the concept and warn of its dangers. Rosenfeld is fearful of The End of the Holocaust (2011) and its minimization in public consciousness. A “diminished historical and moral understanding of the Nazi genocide” (Weissman 2013) is important since it turns the Holocaust into a useless memory that is unable to prevent AS, especially the genocidal form which is aimed at Israel.
In another work entitled *Progressive Jewish Thought and the New Anti-Semitism*, Rosenfeld condemns Jews who question Israel’s legitimacy for giving rise to AS. Rosenfeld is also editor of *Resurgent Antisemitism: Global Perspectives* (Rosenfeld 2013). The book includes chapters discussing AS in European countries, Turkey, Iran and Israel, among other issues related to new AS. Rosenfeld’s own concluding chapter is entitled: *The End of the Holocaust and the Beginnings of a New Antisemitism*.

Andrei S. Markovits is a Romanian born American scholar. He is an Arthur F. Thurnau Professor and the Karl W. Deutsch Collegiate Professor of Comparative Politics and German Studies at the University of Michigan. He has also been a visiting professor in German and Israeli universities. Markovits’ research areas are diverse, but he has always been interested in European AA and AS. Articles and book chapters such as *An Inseparable Tandem of European Identity? Anti-Americanism and Anti-Semitism in the Short and Long Run* (2007a), *European Anti-Americanism and Anti-Semitism: Similarities and Differences* (2005b), *Twin Brothers: European Anti-Semitism and Anti-Americanism* (2003-2005), *Anti-Americanism in Europe: From Elite Disdain to Political Force* (2005a) are some of his published work on this issue. Markovits’ main book on AA is entitled *Uncouth Nation: Why Europe Dislikes America* (Markovits 2007b). *Uncouth Nation* is a book about anti-Americanism, but everywhere, in every passage the author makes sure that Israel is mentioned in some way or another, so the sense of victimization becomes a shared experience for the two entities. Although Israel isn’t mentioned in the title, it can safely be claimed that *Uncouth Nation* is actually a book about anti-Americanism and anti-Israelism/AS. As one reviewer points out, the fifth chapter which specifically discusses anti-Semitism and its link with AA is the longest chapter (Verbeeten 2008). In other words, the book should be seen not as an objective study of anti-Americanism, but an American Jewish intellectual’s specific view of anti-Americanism and its connection with anti-Semitism.
II- Findings
The discourse of the named texts was analyzed with the aim of demonstrating how collective identity plays a role in international relations. In other words, what is in mind here is the fact that relations between two political entities does not exist in vacuum, but is built on an existing ideational atmosphere which can be changed through the activities of specific advocacy groups. In the first section below, the themes in the studied texts are studied, and an analysis of how van Dijk’s persuasive moves play out in the texts is provided in the second section.

Table 1 shows the main themes identified in the analyzed AS literature. The themes cannot be considered as completely distinct and are very much interrelated, and the categorization has been made for the sake of clarity and to make the analysis more comprehensible. It is easy to see how the themes help construct an identity map through what Van Dijk designates as the Ideological Square. The analysis also reveals that more energy is being put into demonstrating the bad characteristics of the Other rather than emphasizing the good traits of the Self. Usually general features such as democracy, freedom, development, etc. suffice to prove the goodness of the Self; features that are, obviously, shared with the Western world and in particular America, but more emphasis is placed on proving the victim status, and on demonstrating that this status is shared with Americans. The issue of Israeli aggression and its policies are seen as only partially influential as sources behind AS and Muslim anger at America and Israel, and in some cases even as an excuse and scapegoat for the Muslim’s own shortcomings which they don’t want to admit to or heal.
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Table 1 - Main themes identified in the Holocaust and anti-Semitism discourse concerning US-Israel relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Theme</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The place of the words America and Israel/Jews or Anti-Americanism and Anti-Semitism in sentences and the choice of words</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Common traits between America and Israel/Jews</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>America and Israel/Jews as Powerful – Power-phobia</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Exclusive victimhood</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Distinction with Europe</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>AS and anti-Americanism as defining feature of a common European identity</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>The link between Muslim/Arab AS and European AS</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>The irrationality of anti-Americanism and AS; Hatred of essence rather than behavior</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Central role of 9/11</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>The importance and danger of AS, denial of or lack of appropriate attention to this issue</td>
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The place of the words ‘America’ and ‘Israel’ or ‘AA and AS’ in sentences and the choice of words

In the selected texts, the words America and Israel/Jews(5), or AA and AS/AI are constantly placed together in one sentence, to convey a sense of similarity. For instance, the two words are separated with conjunctions such as and and or (all bolding added by author to highlight words that convey the named theme): “Another flag is the selective demonization of American or Israeli leaders” (Joffe 2005, 4); and, “When it comes to anti-Zionism and hostility toward Israel, we have long been dealing with a new, legitimated form of anti-Semitism that is coded and, rather than being stuck with the stigma of Jew-baiting, conveys moral nobility, a sense of moral superiority toward the alleged perpetrators de jour, America and Israel” (Markovits 2007b, 167).

Numerous sentences begin with “like Jews, Americans are…”(6). The words selected to describe the commonality are also significant, for example pairing and similar are used: “The mechanism of denigration and demonization (as opposed to policy critique) also applies to the U.S. case” (Joffe 2005, 4); “The routine pairing of Israel and America is the most interesting new motif in an old story” (Ibid,
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10); “This kind of Kulturkritik is a staple of anti-Americanism, and the structural similarities with antisemitism are hard to escape. Like Jews, Americans are...” (Ibid, 12); “And so, America may be the most “Jewish” nation in the Christian world.” (Ibid, 14); “We are living at a time when hostility to America has become almost a worldwide phenomenon, and a parallel dislike of Israel and distrust of the Jews frequently accompany this hostility” (Rosenfeld 2009, 9); “In general, when Jews are now demonized, anti-American charges are likely to proliferate as well. It is a heady combination, especially in the Muslim world, where the language of violence has helped to unleash the most destructive forces aimed at those who are routinely condemned as "the enemies of Islam"-preeminently "Crusaders" (Americans) and "Jews."” (Ibid, 14); “To many, Americans and Jews are not only paired but are now virtually interchangeable as targets of a common hostility” (Ibid); Hostility towards America and Israel are “two closely related antipathies and resentments”, “proper etiquette”, and “acceptable in the discourse of the political Classes” (Markovits 2007b, 1); The heading: “Anti-Americanism and Anti-Semitism as Joint Symbols” (Markovits 2007b, 157); and, The fifth chapter entitled Twin Brothers: European Anti-Semitism and Anti-Americanism. The author insists that the two prejudices are not only similar, but very close. His choice of twin brothers as the appropriate metaphor for describing them (he explains that “close relatives” and “first cousins” are not accurate enough, so he adopts French philosopher Andre’ Glucksmann’s “twin brothers), and his insistence on the link between them throughout the book and before the start of the current chapter, serves to place America and Israel/Jews in the common ingroup.

Whilst AA and AS have important differences, AS scholars are intent on spotting and highlighting any similarity they find, in order to prove how interrelated and inseparable the two are. Alvin Rosenfeld points to “structural similarities” between AA and AS, and “a common vocabulary of defamation and denunciation” (Rosenfeld
“While their developmental histories may differ, the hostilities they release may converge, driven as they are by the same negative energies of fear, anger, envy, and resentment” (Ibid, 3). A negative vocabulary describes AA and AS (negative, fear, anger, envy and resentment), whilst “common vocabulary”, “structural similarities” and “convergence”, “intimately bound up with one another”, “common Bedfellows” (Ibid) are used to portray their interconnectedness in a positive, or at least neutral way.

Markovits also refers to AS as “a consequence of”, “a necessary corollary to” and “an epiphenomenon of” anti-Americanism. All these words maintain that AS follows AA. If Europeans didn’t hate America, they wouldn’t hate Israel and the Jews. Markovits refers to this closeness as “the most important component of the “new” anti-Semitism” (151). But he goes on to correct such a hyperbolic comparison and make his analysis more sophisticated by admitting that there are important differences: AS is much older than AA, and it has led to more brutal outcomes, namely the persecution and genocide of Jews, which has no equivalent in the case of AA. He solves the paradox of AA and AS’s proximity and their simultaneous distinctness, by arguing that European AS can be discussed without referring to AA, but it is impossible to analyze AA without referring to AS. In other words, Americans and Semites are both hated, both victims, but Semites are more victims.

It is also interesting that there is a strong tendency amongst pro-Israel and American Jewish scholars to address the issue of anti-Americanism, a tendency less seen amongst other American scholars. This tendency is often accompanied with a hesitance to criticize America, perhaps because of its crucial role as Israel’s strongest backer. *Hating America: A History* by Barry Rubin (Rubin and Rubin 2004), ……..are some examples.

Another important fact is that Israel advocates enforce the idea that both AA and AI are based on AS; that is, not only is Israel despised because of its Jewish character, but America is hated for the
same reason.

**Common traits between America and Israel:** These common traits can be either negative ones attributed to them by their haters, or positive values, both resulting in America and Israel to be seen as one entity. In the first instance, the claim is that all the negative stereotypes once used to portray Jews are now projected into America, situating the two groups in the victim category. Arrogance, conspiracy, and greed are some of the common features of Jews and Americans. In the second case, America and Israel/Jews are viewed as the embodiment of modernism, capitalism, and globalization.

Arguing that they are considered responsible for any social and economic current that is despised, Joffe states:

> Like the Jews who were blamed for both capitalism and bolshevism, the United States gets it coming and going" (10).

Modernity and change are two values championed by America and Israel, and feared and envied by Europeans and Arabs:

> “modernization is Americanization, and both have found their most faithful disciple in Israel (13).

Markovits sees the European right and left’s antipathy towards modernity and globalization as one of the sources of their AA and AS (179):

> The Europeans’ enmity toward Israel cannot be detached from the Europeans’ thousand-year hatred of the Jews and their shorter and much less lethal, but still palpable, antipathy toward America.”

Followed by “And thus we are back to the three standard pillars of classical anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism: Jews, America, and modernity (Ibid, 200).

Discussing globalization, he asserts that no other country is linked with America as the sole culprit of this “new stage of capitalism” (Ibid, 157) except Israel, and that only American and Israeli flags are burnt at anti-globalization rallies, whilst America’s other “capitalist partners”, including Britain, Germany, France, Canada, Italy, do not receive such treatment (Ibid). The so-called “golden calf incident in
Davos” (Ibid, 159) is mentioned by AS scholars including Markovits as a perfect example of such mutual anti-American and anti-Semitic/anti-Israeli hatred expressed in anti-globalization rallies.

German hostility to America crystallized ideologically in the early twentieth century as a reaction to modernity itself. Urbanization, commercialization, secularization, social mobility, mass culture, meritocracy, democracy, feminism—these and other components of modernity were considered unwelcome encroachments on traditional ways of life (Rosenfeld 2009, 7).

Referring to Joseph Bové’s 2002 visit to Ramallah, Joffe states that: “So here was a spokesman of the anti-globalization movement who was conflating globalization with Americanization and extending his loathing of both to Israel” (9).

Another characteristic that all three scholars studied here agree on, albeit using different terminology, is that America and Israel are undisciplined and rough. Joffe asserts that America and Israel are hated because they are the “outriggers of the Occident”, and like Jews throughout history, “are different from the rest of the West” (Joffe 2005, 13). "Outlaw nations" and “Rogue States”, and “uncouth” nations are the expressions that Rosenfeld and Markovits use respectively, to describe this phenomenon.

Power is another common characteristic, acknowledged by both friends and foes, but since it is an important concept covered by all scholars, it will be studied as a separate theme.

America and Israel as Powerful: One of the main characteristics differentiating between Self and Other (especially the European Other), is the actual possession of, or other's perception of the possession of power. In other words, America and Israel/Jews are despised because they are more powerful, or because, based on conspiracy theories, they are perceived to possess excessive amounts of power.

In his discussion of why America and Israel are different from “the rest of the West”, power is one of the main four factors
mentioned by Joffe (the other three being identity, purpose, and position). He explains that in the military, economy, technology, and education sectors, America and Israel are the most powerful in the global and regional sectors, respectively, and that this superiority is enough to stir “envy and resentment”. In the section under purpose, the author focuses on the way this power is used. Israel and America are “national societies” willing to use force to protect their interests rather than valuing “compromise, cooperation, and institutionalism” like the Europeans, “In fact, no Western nation has ever used force as frequently has have those two in the last fifty years” (Joffe 2005, 14). In this section a readiness to resort to violence, what is mostly seen as a negative trait and can be labeled as war mongering, is presented by the author as a shared American-Israeli value. This readiness is resented by countries that “will not or cannot resort to war”. So Europe’s tendency to manage conflicts through civil means is a source of AA and AI. Europeans simultaneously feel a sense of moral superiority because of their military restraint, and also envy because they cannot be military powerful like America and Israel, and like their own past. Considering Van Dijk’s ideological square, where positive traits and behavior of the Self and negative ones of the Other are highlighted, what happens here is that Joffe goes a step further and implies that the Self and its actions determine what is positive and what is negative. Resorting to violence (and not just possessing military power) is portrayed as a positive characteristic, because the US and Israel are like that.

Under the heading “Denial of Anti-Americanism” (Rosenfeld 2009, 13), Rosenfeld argues that another commonality between the two anti-isms is that they are both denied. This denial is the result of a “distrust of American and Jewish power and the fear that such power will be used in menacing ways” (Ibid). He continues to claim that both Americans and Jews are sympathized with as long as they are perceived as victims, but if they are seen as being in possession of power, this sympathy is “neutralized”. Rosenfeld fails to explain what
is unique or abnormal in sympathizing with victims and being wary of the powerful, especially when the powerful have in many instances abused their power and applied it unjustly to maintain their own interests. This notion of power-phobia, that America and Israel’s sheer possession of power rather than their ethics of using that power, generates resentment and fear, is another way of denying “agency, responsibility and blame for actions”. Even when Rosenfeld does acknowledge that it is the “the unrestrained use of force” that people complain about, he quickly moves to present this fear as “exaggerated” (Ibid, 14) and conspiracy theory based. So it is not what America and Israel do, but what others perceive them as doing, which is mostly an irrational and hyperbolic perception, that generates AA and AI.

Markovits also mentions power as one of the main sources behind AA and AS: because of its association with powerful America, and because of its own possession of power, Israel is opposed by Europeans, who just hate power:

The tough Jew in the form of the omnipotent Israeli has led to a new twist on the longstanding interaction between anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism” and that “Being prejudiced against the powerful has an entirely different social acceptability than being prejudiced against the weak (Markovits 2007b, 176).

So it follows that: “deriding the Jews is not tolerated because the Jews are weak; deriding Israel is praiseworthy because Israel is strong” (Ibid, 177). He continues that this reason could not suffice since America has other allies that are not hated as much. So the real reason must be the Jewish nature of Israel, and since Europeans just hate Jews (exactly like how they just hate power; an irrational hatred with no practical and real reason), they will hate a Jewish state. Further reiterating this argument, Markovits states that classic AS has become unacceptable in developed countries because it is based on the perception of Jews as weak, whilst AI is acceptable and in fact fashionable since Israel is powerful, and that Palestinians are seen as
the new Jew, oppressed by Israel (Ibid, 14).

Although he does not use the expression, but conspiracy theory is a resurgent theme. Here he states that “From then on, Jews and America became inextricably intertwined, not only as representatives of modernity but also as holders of actual power” and continues that “One of the standard staples of European anti-Semitism has always been to impute much more power to Jews than they actually have.”, a power that is “clandestine and cliquish” (Ibid, 156). These sentences aim to describe a phobia based on perception rather than reality, a threat that has no logical and real basis.

What makes this constant reference to power-phobia in new AS texts even more important is the fact that the transformation of Jewish and Israeli identities from David to Goliath in the previous decades has had a profound influence on how they are perceived by themselves and others. It is important to note that the European and American reaction to this changing identity has been completely different; Americans were impressed with the rising power of Israel (Rynhold 2015) whilst Europeans are said to resent such power. With the evolution of Jews from a persecuted minority to a powerful and influential sector of a multicultural society in America, and of Israel from a small colony to a regime with one of the most powerful military forces in the region, the victimhood narrative is becoming more and more difficult to pursue (which is one reason why Israel advocates are concerned about the end of the Holocaust, and are bent on keeping the memory and discourse of Jewish persecution, and the threat of AS, alive). Failing to acknowledge that power should be accompanied with responsibility, and aiming to discharge both America and Israel of the need and obligation to answer their choices and policies, AS scholars use all sorts of arguments to prove that all criticism equals AA and AS, which are irrational sentiments based on a combination of a general phobia of power and hatred towards Jews.

Exclusive victimhood: In some cases, America and Israel’s common victimhood is described as being exclusive and exceptional.
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The following quotation from Rosenfeld, for example, implies that Israel and America’s victim status is the most extreme type that exists, as if this victimhood is a kind of exclusive club that only these two are admitted in; translating into a specific kind of exceptionalism: “The distinction of being reviled in such terms is one that Israel shares with only one other country: the United States of America” (Rosenfeld 2009, 6).

AS scholars are claiming in an indirect manner that being hated and envied, being considered “outlaw nations”, is both cause and effect of their exceptionalism, something they can even be proud of. These authors also argue that although this situation is exclusive to America and Israel, Israel is more vulnerable since its very existence is targeted: There is an added edge, an additional enthusiasm, in the voice and passion of Israel’s detractors that one simply cannot see in the case of any other country in the world, with the possible exception of the United States. But even in America’s case the hatred rarely extends to a constant doubting of the legitimacy of the country’s very existence. (Markovits, 185).

**Distinction with Europe:** As mentioned in previous sections, AS scholars believe that America and Israel are different from the rest of the West, in other words, from Europe. Since Europe and the Islamic world form the main others in new AS literature, it makes sense for them to devote so much to counting the defining differences between themselves and Europe. This also helps explain why Europe is anti-American and anti-Semite.

*Power, identity, purpose, and position,* are introduced by Joffe as the key four factors that differentiate America and Israel from Europe. This is clearly a language of boundary setting: we are different, in a positive way, from the rest of the West; we are the ingroup, and they are the outgroup, and that explains why they hate us. Note that the hatred is one-way; no negative sentiment or action goes from Us to Them, and it is Them who hate Us. Joffe sets out to describe the four factors in detail. Below each one, he explains how America and Israel
are similar, and goes on to clarify why Europe (and in some cases the Arab world) are different. Since the two concepts of power and purpose have been described in previous sections, only identity and position will be explained below.

Furthermore, Europe is Otherized through being associated with other villains. As van Dijk has mentioned, one method of proving the negative features of the Other is to relate it to well-known and despised villains: “Another strategy is to compare a target enemy with another, certified enemy, e.g. Gadhafi with Saddam Hussein, and Saddam Hussein with Hitler, and all of them with devils and demons.” (Dijk 1998, 59-60). This Otherization is achieved partly through highlighting French and German refusal to join the American-led coalition to invade Iraq in 2003. Concluding from a poll stating that 30% of the French wanted Iraq to win rather than the American led coalition that the French despise Bush more than Saddam, Rosenfeld links the French to Saddam Hussain (Rosenfeld 2009, 11).

Regarding Germany, he discusses Gerhard Schroder’s reelection for a second term in 2002, analyzing his success as a consequence of his AA and refusal to join the American-led coalition to attack Iraq. What is not discussed is the actual and logical reasons why Germany did not want to be part of the adventure, giving the sense that it was all based on irrational sentiment and resentment, sentiments that are, quoting from Henry Kissinger, a “permanent feature of German politics” (Ibid, 3).

Markovits generalizes French and German Otherness to the rest of Europe: “But this issue [Germany’s AS and AA] goes far beyond the Germans and pertains to all of Europe” (Markovits 2007b, 199). In Otherizing Europe, a special place is reserved for Germany, which some Israel advocates view as eternally doomed because of its Nazi past. In Rosenfeld’s long citation from Dan Diner (Rosenfeld 2009, 7), weird and irrational conspiracy theories regarding the relationship between Jews and America are attributed to Germans. None of the
mentioned German assumptions are analyzed; they are just
discredited through making them appear unrealistic and exaggerated.

Joffe insists on the importance of Germany, and Resurrects its
Nazi past as a reason why AS or AI in that country should be taken
seriously. By his use of psychological terminology, and reference to
psychiatrists like Freud and Zvi Rex, he is suggesting that Germany
should be viewed as a threatening psychic (a view that is later
extended to all of Europe): “A cynical insight has been ascribed to the
Israeli psychiatrist Zvi Rex: “The Germans will never forgive the Jews
for Auschwitz,” meaning that the survivors and the state of the Jews
are constant reminders of the moral failure not only of Germany, but
also of Europe” (Joffe 2005, 7). Markovits agrees with Joffe, arguing
that post war German AS is a “defense mechanism” to relieve the
nation of their sense of guilt (Markovits 2007b, 152).

Markovits adds another dimension to Germany’s psychic
situation; that it is indebted for all it has today to “foreign powers”:
“It is hard to swallow the fact that Germany did not attain its now
vaunted democratic culture, pacifism, and sense of virtue on its own
but by dint of foreign powers vanquishing Hitler’s dictatorship. And
when both victors, in their very different ways, are perceived as clearly
inferior to Germans—culturally, politically, in terms of bravery, valor,
and perseverance of the troops, to name just a few pertinent items—
the defeat stings all the more and, on some level, never was accepted.
Adding insult to injury, both the Americans and the Soviets remained
strongly identified with Jews and Jewry in the minds of Germans”
(Ibid, 199).

Demonization of Germany and constant reference to its guilty
past, which is often extended to all of Europe (and even to America,
regarding its hesitance to stop the genocide), should be understood
within the larger context of keeping the memory of the Holocaust
and the threat of genocidal AS alive, which has formed one of the
main strategies of Israel advocates, and is used to prove the necessity
of a Jewish state whilst silencing any criticism.
**AA and AS as defining feature of a common European identity:** Another commonality between AA and AS, referred to by numerous AS scholars, is that both serve as defining factors of a common European identity. Markovits has no doubt that anti-Semitism is assuming an important European function—as a pan-European discourse steeped in tradition, and (above all) as an important ingredient in the European emotional repertoire—just when the establishment of a new European proto- or quasi-state has become (and is likely to remain) a political reality in Europe’s everyday life (Markovits 2007b, 157). He also states that “Europe’s anti-Americanism has become an essential ingredient in—perhaps even a key mobilizing agent for—the inevitable formation of a common European identity” (Ibid, 7).

Referring to Hannah Arendt’s “views on the theme of how America as Europe’s “other” and European anti-Americanism might prove essential in producing a European identity that Arendt labeled “Europeanism.”” “She attached a pejorative meaning to this term because she associated with it an identity formation based merely on a facile populist deployment of anti-Americanism appealing to negative forces such as resentment and exclusion” (Ibid, 204).

**The link between Muslim/Arab AS and European AS:** New AS scholars insist that classical AS, which was overt and called for the annihilation of the Jews, and disappeared in Europe after WWII, has evolved into a new version which is sublime and hidden. Meanwhile the classic version has traveled to the Islamic world (Joffe 2005, 1) (which is always backward, and is now experiencing what Europe has previously experienced and put behind). “Deeply rooted in both religious and secular European culture, as well as in the Islamic world, such attitudes represent an aversion to the idea of Jewish empowerment itself” (Rosenfeld 2009, 13).

Markovits discusses how European AS, and AS brought by Muslim immigrants to Europe merge together. He speaks of the fact that because of wide scale immigration of Muslims to European
countries, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is brought to the continent, which has the effect of reviving AS: By having to adjudicate far-away conflicts on their own soil—that is, when the
Middle East conflict is suddenly carried out in the middle of
Ham-burg, London, or Paris—these European states invariably
and inevitably are drawn into disputes that willy-nilly involve
Jews yet again. And their populations do not like it (Markovits
2007b, 181).

The irrationality of AA and AS; Hatred of essence rather than
behavior: A common theme in all AS literature is to present
frustration with American or Israeli policies as irrational and baseless
sentiments, arguing that America and Israel/Jews are hated because
of who they are rather than what they do, and also because of the
hater's own identity issues. Such arguments have the effect of
automatically discrediting the other.

Joffe, for instance, insists that although such sentiments have
increased in the aftermath of the Iraq War, they are much deeper and
older and are not a consequence of American or Israeli behavior
(Joffe 2005, 2). After his long discussion of German AS and AI, and
to demonstrate that the problem is not limited to one country,
Rosenfeld turns to an analysis of the issue in France. But the French
case seems to be different, with the core problem being its Muslim
minority. Criticism of Israel translates into AA since America is
"understood to be Israel's guardian" (Ibid, 9). After a long description
of AS attacks against Jewish synagogues, individuals and businesses,
Rosenfeld states that: “The outbreak of violent anti-Semitism in
France has occurred at a time when anti-Americanism has also
become a more prominent feature of French political and intellectual
life” (Ibid, 10). And the reason for French AA: “reasons that are as
much related to France's ambivalence about its place in the new
Europe and its reduced standing in the world as about real policy
differences with America” (Ibid). So the French conception of the
Self is part of the country’s problem with America.
Diverting attention from real problems is seen as another common function of AA and AS. Quoting the French writer Pascal Bruckner Rosenfeld writes: “In the imagination of many intellectuals and political leaders, America plays the role the Jews once did in National Socialist demonology” (Ibid, 11).

Central role of 9/11: For Israel advocates, most notably those focused on new AS, 9/11 is a turning point in the construction of a collective identity. Israel advocates pounced on the opportunity and used two arguments to enforce the we-feeling: first was the ripe and rare sense of victimhood in Americans, which was a rare opportunity that has last appeared in the Pearl Harbor attack incident. Israel advocates, including government spokespeople and ambassadors, started comparing the New York attacks to terrorist attacks inside Israel. This framing technique was on full display during Israel’s 2008 attack on Gaza, and was used frequently as an excuse for the regime’s excessive use of force and to garner support among American public. In another phase, quotes from al-Qaeda members arguing that American support for Israel was an important motivator for the terrorist attacks in New York, are highlighted and repeated. Such texts imply that since the enemy is seeing us as one entity, then we probably are a one (Joffe). “Seeking to kill Americans and Jews everywhere in the world,” Osama Bin Laden exhorted Muslims, “is one of the greatest duties, and the good deed most preferred by Allah” (Joffe 2005, 11).

The importance and danger of AS, denial of or lack of appropriate attention to this issue

Describing attribution, van Dijk states that “those of Us who are too friendly towards our enemies do not fully realize what they are doing, and hence they may be advised to mend their ways” (1998, 58). AS scholars are constantly complaining that adequate attention is not paid to AA and AS, which are serious threats with the potential of initiating genocide. Under the heading “Denial of Anti-Americanism” (Rosenfeld 2009, 13), Rosenfeld argues that another commonality
between the two anti-isms is that they are both denied.

Rosenfeld’s concluding paragraph is chilling:

Adding the name of the president of the United States to this formula, as in the vile epithet at the beginning of this essay, only deepens the aggression and adds to the challenges that we face in a world in which anti-Semitism, a notoriously light sleeper, is now awake and stirring and has been joined by a resurgent anti-Americanism. Neither is new, but their convergence is potent and the obsessive focus of so much of their negative energies on Israel and on America as a faithful ally of Israel is ominous. Unless they are effectively checked, the two together will influence the condition of life for Americans and Jews in the years ahead in ways that will not be easy for either (Ibid, 16).

The last sentence again places America and Israel/Jews in the same category, implying that unless Americans see us as a collective, and move to combat our common enemy, they will share our bleak future.

Van Dijk believes that the discourse structures which lead to the formation of polarized models and negative attitude schemata need to be discussed in more detail. He maintains that apart from “semantic content” that directly presents the mentioned positive and negative descriptions of the Self and Other, persuasive moves are also employed to inject credibility to such descriptions. Of the persuasive moves that he names, the two cases of “Story telling; providing personal experience and related details”, and “Quoting credible witnesses and sources” (van Dijk 1993, 264) are of interest here.

Van Dijk explains that witnesses, sources or experts are often quoted in discourse in order to make the author’s arguments convincing. Markovits’ mention of the first report on anti-Semitism in fifteen European countries published by the European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) can be viewed in this light. The fact that the report “says unambiguously that the European Left’s acute antipathy toward Israel is partially concealing anti-Semitism in both tone and content, and that these
emotions cannot be separated from aversion to America” confirms that the close link btw anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism is not just a claim made by Israel advocates since it is also mentioned in supposedly objective reports and analysis.

Markovits insists on his personal beliefs as a leftist. He goes to lengths to assert that he is a leftist in all matters, but not considered one by American and European leftists because of his lack of anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism. This personal narrative is offered to prove the integral place of these two sentiments in defining political identity. In fact, one reviewer asserts that this book is most notable for what it reveals about its author as “a liberal Jewish intellectual in the 21st century” (Verbeeten 2008, 150).

Rosenfeld asserts that he has observed the link between AA and AS firsthand: “I was in Germany for two weeks in May 2002, when some of these trends were coming to the fore.” (Rosenfeld 2009, 2), and “Hollander correctly notes the resemblance of anti-Americanism to other kinds of deeply felt aversions and hostilities, including those that fuel anti-Semitism. The link between these two biases became evident during my time in Germany last spring” (Ibid, 5).

Markovits also mentions his personal experience of European AA, explaining how Viennese teachers censured his American dialect and American spelling: “Markovits, we are not in the Wild West, we are not in Texas. Behave yourself” (Markovits 2007b, xi).

Conclusion

Answering the article’s question of how non-governmental actors can play an active role in international relations and influence the relationship between states, the academic discourse of pro-Israel scholars and its construction of common identity between America and Israel was studied. The analysis demonstrates that through Holocaust and AS literature the authors are drawing a map, or to put it more clearly, an identity map that clarifies the boundaries between Self and Other. Americans are supposed to be informed through
these materials as to who their friends and enemies are, and why. The positive features and behaviors of the Self, and the negative features and behaviors of the Other are identified and highlighted, exactly as van Dijk’s ideological square explains. In order to prove more forcefully the enmity of the Other, history is fervently examined to demonstrate that all the different Others (Nazis, communists, Muslims/Palestinians, etc.) are linked one way or the other, and are united in their never-ending endeavor to destroy the Self and its civilization. Through this map, some aspects of the American identity are shaped; aspects that lead to a common identity with Israel and prepare the atmosphere for a friendship based on the Kantian culture between the two entities. At the same time the authors strive to push America’s relationship with the Muslim world to the third degree Hobbesian culture, which is based on the role relationship of enmity. In other words, the Kantian culture is restricted to US-Israel relations and does not extend to other states. Enmity and bias, rather than being totally overcome, are refocused on another group. Islam and the Muslim world are presented as the threatening Other that is determined to destroy the Self (consisting of America and Israel, and in some cases the Western or civilized world more generally) through violence, and so must be dealt with through the use of violence. Campbell’s notion of a “discourse of danger” perfectly describes the situation: “Working out of a postmodernist perspective, Campbell argues that the American state depends on a “discourse of danger” in which state elites periodically invent or exaggerate threats to the body politic in order to produce and sustain an “us” in distinction to “them,” and thereby justify the existence of their state.” (Ibid, p. 275). Whether Israel advocates are the inventors or exaggerators of Muslim threat as the discourse of danger is a question that remains to be answered, but what is clear is that it is forcefully used to distinguish between the “internal” and “external” and so the collective identity between the two countries is dependent on it.

Aiming to provide a deeper interpretation of the analyzed
themes than the Self/Other dichotomy, three different lines of thought can be identified in the analyzed literature. These notions have the overall effect of building an atmosphere in which pro-Israel foreign policy is seen as natural by Americans:

1. Conveying similarity between America and Israel in terms of their simultaneous power and victimhood, which place them in an exceptional situation. The constant equating of anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism builds on the common victimhood argument. This line of thought has the effect of justifying and rationalizing their use of force, an act that is protested not just by Muslims but also in some cases by Europeans. America and Israel are entitled to destroy their enemies with force, because they are lonely warriors in an unfriendly world, and face a similar, irrational hatred.

2. Keeping the fear alive through constant reference to the Holocaust (and its guilt and fear production functionality) and anti-Semitism. This is essential in the construction of a common threat; Americans should not remember these vices and feel the ever-present, daunting threat.

3. An important case made by the studied scholars is that hatred towards America and Israel stems from identity rather than behavior. The effect of this argument is to frame any criticism and complaint as irrational and unjustified. None of these criticisms and complaints are discussed in an objective manner, all are dismissed as the simple story of Them hating Us because of who we are.

These lines of thought contribute to the construction of a specific narrative. In this narrative, anti-Semitism which was passed on to Islamists by the Nazis (although here they don’t agree on whether the virus went from Nazis to Islamists or vice-versa), is a living, dangerous peril (perhaps the most dangerous) that does not only threatens Semites, but America and Americans as well. Through the concept of new anti-Semitism, it is established that more or less any criticism of Israel falls under the category of anti-Semitism, thus securing uncritical American support for Israel (at least in theory). In
other words, America has to confront criticism of Israel and unconditionally support the regime, because such criticism is veiled anti-Semitism, which is a direct danger to America itself. This means that Israel is in fact becoming part of the American Self.

This study concludes that Alexander Wendt’s constructivist international relations provides a theoretical framework that is able to both incorporate the complexities and multidimensional nature of the US-Israel special relationship, and to take into account the role of non-governmental actors in the form of pro-Israel scholars in influencing the relationship through the construction of academic discourse. Nevertheless, this is just a specific case, and whether the theoretical framework can be generalized requires further case studies.
Notes

1. The terms collective identity and common identity will be used interchangeably in this article.

2. The concept of model is central to van Dijk’s sociocognitive approach. He defines models as “mental representations of experiences, events or situations, as well as the opinions we have about them” (1993, 258).

3. Arnold Forster and Benjamin R. Epstein’s 1974 book The New Anti-Semitism is one of the earliest examples of such a claim, but the real wave of new AS literature came in the early years of the 21st century. Anti-Semitism rose in Europe in the aftermath of the Iraq War, and this was referred to by new AS scholars as evidence to their claims. Pierre-Andre Taguieff’s Rising From the Muck: The New Anti-Semitism in Europe (2004), Phyllis Chesler’s The New Anti-Semitism (2003), and Abraham Foxman’s Never Again! The Threat of the New Anti-Semitism (2004) are some of the main books written in this period.

4. Information from Joffe’s bio page on The Israel Democracy Institute website at: http://www.en.idi.org.il/about-idi/international-advisory-council/josef-joffe/

5. The author [me] does not believe that Jews and Israelis are equal. Placing them together in the analysis is because of the fact that in many instances new AS scholars do not differentiate between Jews and Israel.

6. Pages 11 and 12 of Joffe’s work are full of such sentences.

7. A French farmer, politician and anti-globalization activist who in 1999, together with his supporters, dismantled a McDonald’s under construction in the town of Millau.

8. Mira Sucharov discusses this identity conflict inside Israel in her book The International Self: Psychoanalysis And the Search for Israeli-Palestinian Peace, where she refers to the contradictory “defensive-warrior” and “aggressive” and role-identities.

9. Markovits grants America near-total agency and credit for wiping out AS, at least for a few decades, from the continent. He states that America’s military intervention in Europe in WWII led to a delegitimization of anti-Semitism there which lasted for 50 years (P. 157).

References


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